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rescue freedom and democracy, does not propose small cures for great evils.
He believes that we are well on our way to ruin, and that if we do not call a
halt we shall first be plagued by demagogues and then enslaved by tyrants.
In order to call a halt he would go back, in effect, to the principles of the
"Old Republicans" of 1798: radical decentralization of political and financial
power, radical federalism. Since even Jefferson became a tyrant in the
opinion of the "Old Republicans," this is going a long way back, and the
road will be hard to find. Yet one can only applaud the logic with which
Judge Seabury makes his case.
A revived and strengthened federalism in government (based on a re-
vived faith in natural rights), and in industry the development of coopera-
tives and perhaps a form of Guild Socialism: this is Judge Seabury's pre-
scription. He is well aware that nothing will be done unless he can persuade
his fellow-citizens to agree with the gloomy words he quotes from Ortego y
Gasset's The Revolt of the Masses: "This is the gravest danger that today
threatens civilization: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous
social effort by the State. . . The result of this tendency will be fatal ...
The State, after sucking out the very marrow of society, will be left bloodless,
a skeleton, dead with that rusty death of machinery, more gruesome than
the death of a living organization."
Judge Seabury tries eloquently to make this view prevail; but a brief
look at Washington, or at Whitehall, suggests he has a long way to go. The
mounting demands of the cold war will not help him.
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PRE-TRIAL. By Harry D. Nims. With an Introduction by Harold J. Gal-
lagher, President of the American Bar Association. New York: Baker, Voor-
his & Co., Inc., 1950. Pp. xviii, 334. $5.75.
This is an excellent handbook for lawyers and judges in the newly
developed art of pre-trial. Over the last fifteen years there has been a
steadily increasing interest in pre-trial conferences. Conducted by the
judge with counsel before the actual trial, such conferences are geared to
settle various matters which, in actuality, are not or need not be contested,
and to strip the case to the heart of the precise dispute between the parties.
Thus, simplification of the issues, amendment of the pleadings where neces-
sary, admissions of fact and of documents as exhibits to avoid unnecessary
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proof, settlement of items of damage (such as hospital bills), limitation of
the number of expert witnesses-all these and other matters formerly the
subject of courtroom wrangling or haggling-are settled in advance with a
minimum of friction and maximum of gain in trial expedition and efficiency.
An important by-product, though properly approached more as a desirable
consequence than as a compelled objective, is the settlement of the case
without trial. Thus the system has proven a boon to courts facing over-
crowded calendars and to litigants desiring the prompt and discriminating
disposition of their disputes. This book shows, with a wealth of examples,
how the courts most successful in operating this modern device proceed to
make it work.
It is over-long that Anglo-Saxon justice has been dominated by the
spirit of trial by combat. Unfortunately the development of the jury ac-
centuated, rather than lessened, this concept of a trial as a contest of skills
where tactical shrewdness warranted its reward. Every major step in
procedural reform, from code pleading on, has involved a contraction of this
unusual emphasis on the adversary nature of the proceedings. This has
occurred more recently at an accelerating rate, what with the decreased
importance of formally-defined issues and the large role now played by
deposition and discovery devices. No longer is it a violation of an adver-
sary's sacred rights to go on a "fishing expedition" to find out what the
other's case actually consists of; indeed, it is rightfully expected that there
will no longer be concealed traps for the litigants, or even for the judge, but
that the entire case will be disclosed to the participants and to the court
substantially before the trial begins. Of course the development of arbitra-
tion is a concurrent example of this trend. Into this modern picture the pre-
trial conference fits most naturally. In view of the informality of modern
pleadings, such conferences are in fact rather necessary, as a means of
illuminating what the parties are ultimately contesting, after the helpful
preliminary explorations by discovery have been had. But more, this is a
substitution of the conference method at a time when counsel have so ac-
quired sufficient information regarding their case that some exchange may
be productive of a maximum of accomplishment. Perhaps its greatest
utility is in forcing counsel to know their case, even to the point of setting
its value for settlement purposes before, and not at the end of, a full-scale
trial.
There is nothing particularly novel about a conference between counsel
and the court; it may happen often during a litigated case over details of the
procedure. What is novel here is its use before, and not in the midst of,
trial and in its use in a systematic way under the direction of an expert ad-
ministrator to cover certain definite matters. In its modern form it was
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initiated in about 1929 in a busy trial court in Detroit, was copied a few
years later in Boston, received immense stimulus from the attention paid
to it in the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1936 and 1937,1 and has
since spread widely about the country. A recent authoritative work states
that it is authorized by rule or statute in twenty-nine states,2 while other
jurisdictions employ it in local areas, such as New York City. Both the
Judicial Conference of the United States and the Section of Judicial Ad-
ministration of the American Bar Association have been interested in ad-
vancing the reform. This book is a part of their program. It is written by a
distinguished lawyer and legal author who, from long service on the New
York Judicial Council and in other groups interested in legal reform, is
recognized as a tried crusader. It fills a need, so that no neophyte judge
should now want for knowledge of what to do and how to do it.
One thing demonstrated by this survey most clearly is that no one
single method necessarily guarantees maximum success. The system is
adaptable to the idiosyncrasies of the individual judge; indeed it will not
achieve results unless the judge is interested or enthusiastic. Hence in the
great federal system it has been wise and necessary to leave its use optional
with the judges. In a court organization now so thoroughly integrated as
that of New Jersey it has been possible to require pre-trial in all courts for
civil litigation. That, however, is still unusual. On many details there is
much diversity in practice. These involve such matters as the place of the
conference, whether in chambers or in the courtroom; the timing, whether
slightly or substantially before the date set for trial; the choice of the pre-
siding judge, whether the destined trial judge or one who will not sit; the
presence or absence of the parties themselves; the subject matter, partic-
ularly the suggestions to be made as to possible settlements; and the extent
of recording the proceedings and embodying the results in a binding pre-
trial order. 3 As to the latter, experience does seem to show that such an
order is quite necessary or the conferences will have little permanent effect
on the case other than to produce a certain number of settlements. And
there is a consensus of view that the judge should carefully avoid exercising
pressure for a compromise, a desirable outcome, but one that should flow
1. Although apparently overlooked here, see note 4 infra, this preceded the activities
of the American Bar Association and has been perhaps the greatest single stimulus to the
spread of pre-trial throughout the country; in fact, FED. R. Civ. P. 16 on pre-trial procedure
is the most widely copied of all the governing provisions. An advantage it had-one we
owe to Chairman William D. Mitchell of the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee who
worked it out-was the spelling out of the different matters properly to be developed in
such a conference, a specification always useful in the popularization of a new device. See
Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 493, 501, 502 (1950).
2. VANDERBILT, Miumuitm STANDAPDS OF JUDIcIAL ADmNISTRATION 206-18 (1949).
3. With the material in the book there may also be compared the illuminating experi-
ence in a highly important field of federal litigation set forth in detail in McAllister, The
Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REv. 27 (1950), an article
appearing after publication of this book.
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naturally from the clarification of the case in conference, rather than from
coercion of the parties by the court.
Within its purpose, therefore, this book is an appropriate exemplifica-
tion of this useful trial adjunct. There is no attempt to explore other as-
pects of the subject than those indicated. The historical picture is not
fully developed ;4 nor is there any attempt to integrate it specifically with
other parts of modem procedure to show the philosophy which supports
its present-day practicality. What statistics are given appear to be the
reports from individual judges or courts in direct correspondence with the
author. Thus we do not have-nor are there yet available-complete mass
statistics to show how, in our busiest courts, the system is actually working
in the court picture as a whole, and what proportion of cases are pre-tried
successfully. That kind of comparative analysis was not needed for the
immediate purpose in view. It may well be useful and necessary later, for
there is still considerable resistance, in both bench and bar, to the decline of
the adversary ideal in litigation. A comparable and, indeed, supplementary
device, the summary judgment, has had rather hard sledding at the hands
of some tribunals from just such an outlook; serious studies of the rise and
decline in use of this device, too, would be helpful in reconsidering its value.5
Pre-trial is still in the heyday of its popularity, though there have been in-
timations of like judicial doubts as to it.6 An analysis of comparable results
in the total court picture is always useful in appraising where we are and
considering where we should like or ought to go. Meanwhile we can be duly
grateful for the sound piece of evangelism embodied in this volume.
CnARLEs E. CLARK
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MONEY IN THE LAW-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL. A Comparative
Study in the Borderline of Law and Economics. By Arthur Nussbaum.
Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. xxxii, 618. $8.00.
The first edition of Dr. Nussbaum's book in 1939 was a pioneer work,
the first in English on the thorny but vital topic of the law of money. It
4. This may have led to the unfortunate mistake of the President of the Bar Associa-
tion in his Introduction in giving priority in this field to the Section of Judicial Administra-
tion of the A.B.A. The work of the latter followed after, and took much inspiration from,
the acceptance of the procedure by the Advisory Committee, first in its Preliminary Draft
of 1936, in Rule 23, and later in its Report of April 1937, in the now well-known Rule 16.
5. I have discussed this somewhat morefully in the article cited note 1 supra.
6. Compare the dissent in American Machine & Metals v. De Bothezat Impeller Co.,
173 F.2d 890, 891 (2d Cir. 1949). There appears to be question in some quarters as to the
complete utility of the various pre-trial devices in long-protracted litigation such as the
usual antitrust case; but in the article previously cited, note 3 supra, Mr. McAllister demon-
strates clearly not only the utility, but the absolute need, of pre-trial control of just this
type of case.
